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  During the last two decades of the twentieth century, Brazil went 
through a sequence of failed stabilization plans that tried to cope with an 
enduring hyperinflation. This paper uses a money demand model to evaluate 
monetary policies during those episodes. The consistency between the money 
supply and the expected conditional money demand growth rates is 
considered for each plan. It is shown that the unsuccessful programs were 
marked by excessive liquidity. The results not only suggest that the 
mismanagement of the monetary aggregates led to the failure of the plans, 
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“A politician meets ten economists. Nine of them paint 
a dark scenario that implies painful adjustments. 
Those are the vultures. The tenth economist is sure, 
however, that everything is fine, that no adjustment 
is necessary. This is the canary. The politician always 
follows the canary.” 
– L. P. Rosenberg in Os Pais do Cruzado Contam por 
Que Não Deu Certo (1987). 
 
1 Introduction 
Part of the recent monetary history of Brazil was marked by 
hyperinflation and a sequence of unsuccessful macroeconomic stabilization 
plans based on the so-called “economic heterodoxy.” The plans were devised 
mostly by structuralist, Keynesian, Post-Keynesian, and Marxist economists, 
who dominated the academic discussion in Brazil and occupied the most 
important government positions during that period. 
The basic tenets of economic heterodoxy were that inflation in Brazil 
was an inertial phenomenon, microeconomically justified by distributive 
conflicts, and that the fiscal problem was not the cause but the result of 
inflation, following the argument developed by Tanzi (1977). The government 
deficit was supposedly aggravated by “excessive” public debt interest 
payments, which were rejected by some even on moral grounds. Money 
supply growth rates played no role in their analysis, since money was 3 
considered passive – a purely endogenous variable, determined by the needs 
of the economic agents and not by Central Bank policies.1 
According to those economists – the canaries, the sudden reduction of 
the inflation rate and the elimination of the inertial factors (generalized 
indexation, for example) would lead to a nearly self-fulfilling low-inflation 
equilibrium. The automatic reduction of the budget deficit and of the 
distributive conflict that would follow an intervention would lead to 
additional inflation reduction, creating a virtuous circle. After 
remonetization, money growth rates would passively decrease at par with 
inflation, such that there would be no need to restrict monetary growth. 
Unrestricted remonetization was welcome, since it would contribute to the 
reduction of the outstanding public debt, and consequently to the reduction of 
the budget deficit. 
 On the other hand, “economic orthodoxy,” which represented the view 
that hyperinflation in Brazil was a monetary phenomenon, driven mainly by 
the government dependency on inflationary revenue sources, was defended by 
a smaller group of economists – the vultures. The orthodox view was largely 
rejected at the political level given its proposal that a stabilization program 
would only succeed if preceded by unpopular fiscal and monetary 
adjustments.2 
                                            
1 See for example Pereira (1987) and Baer (1987). 
2 See for example Simonsen (1989) and Barbosa et al. (1989). 4 
These economists were also associated, correctly or not, with previous 
military governments, and with the painful macroeconomic adjustment 
policies that took place after the oil shocks in the seventies and the debt crisis 
in the eighties. This reputation transformed their proposals into an even 
harder sell. 
From 1986 to 1991 Brazil went through five heterodox stabilization 
programs: Cruzado (1986), Bresser (1987), Verão (1989), Collor (1990) and 
Collor II (1991). These five plans proved to be flagrant failures. The sixth 
stabilization program, the Real plan (1994), was the only to succeed at 
containing hyperinflation. This paper will show that, despite using a concept 
borrowed from the heterodox agenda – the “indexed currency,” the Real plan 
succeeded, among other reasons, because it was the sole stabilization plan 
that presented a post stabilization monetary growth rate expansion 
consistent with the expected nominal money demand growth rate under a 
feasible low-inflation trajectory. 
To achieve this result, the paper will employ a money demand growth 
rate model to check the consistency of monetary policies during each 
stabilization episode. Actual M1 supply growth rates will be compared with 
money demand growth rate forecasts based on scenarios representing 
different policymaker choices and expectations. The money demand growth 
rate model will be shown to be sufficiently stable in order to generate forecast 
confidence intervals. 5 
Notice that an adequate money supply growth during stabilization is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for the success of a plan. Other 
macroeconomic conditions have to be met – for example, aggregate demand 
needs to be compatible with aggregate supply during stabilization, and, for 
that, the real interest rate may play an essential role, which will not be 
considered here. Yet, an adequate remonetization of the economy after 
stabilization is one of the trickiest tasks to be performed by a central bank, 
and therefore the importance of evaluating the level of monetary growth 
during transition with the best forecasting tools available to the policymaker. 
The Brazilian recent history of monetary policy mismanagement will 
be studied therefore with the help of a capable money demand growth rate 
forecast model. To construct such a model for the Brazilian economy, tests for 
the presence of unit roots will be performed. Johansen’s cointegration tests 
will lead to the nonrejection of the null of noncointegration. A growth rate 
model for M1 will be chosen, considering the interventions that happened 
during the sample period of choice (1983-1999). A variable seasonal pattern, 
defined as a function of the nominal interest rate, an original contribution of 
this paper, will substantially improve its predictive power. 
Note that aggregates broader than M1 cannot be used to evaluate 
monetary policies in Brazil, since those aggregates, due to hyperinflation, 
carry a very large share of floating rate assets, presenting therefore a strong 
positive correlation with the abnormally high nominal interest rates. 6 
Consequently,  M1, which in Brazil does not include interest-earning 
accounts, is the only monetary aggregate that clearly reflects systematic 
monetary expansions and contractions due to nominal interest rate changes, 
and as such will be the only aggregate considered. 
Finally, it will be shown that unsuccessful macroeconomic stabilization 
programs were marked by excessive liquidity, with money supply exceeding 
expected conditional money demand during intervention periods.  
2  The Conditional Demand for Money 
Consider as a benchmark the baseline inflation-targeting model 
presented in Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999). It has two equations, an IS 
curve and a Phillips curve: 
  [ ] t t t t t t t g x E E i x + + π − φ − = + + 1 1  (IS) 
  t t t t t u E x + π β + λ = π +1 , (Phillips)   
where xt is the output gap, it is the nominal interest rate, πt is the inflation 
rate,  gt is the possibly autocorrelated demand innovation and ut is the 
possibly autocorrelated supply innovation. Note that no concept of money 
enters this system: the monetary side of the economy is entirely represented 
by the nominal interest rate – the policy instrument. 
  In the same paper, Clarida, Galí and Gertler justify the choice of the 
interest rate as the policy instrument, in place of a monetary aggregate: 
“Large unobservable shocks to money demand produce high volatility of 7 
interest rates when a monetary aggregate is used as the policy instrument. It 
is largely for this reason that an interest rate instrument may be preferable.” 
  Yet, monitoring one or more definitions of money could be a useful 
monetary policy tool, even when the interest rate is the policy instrument. 
Consider for example the money demand equation used in Clarida, Galí and 
Gertler (1999): 
  t t t t t v i y p m + η − κ + =  (2.1)   
  Given projections for yt, it and pt, the conditional behavior of mt can be 
forecasted using the model above. Econometric analysis would lead to 
probability intervals for mt, which would depend on the statistical process 
driving  vt. Forecasted values could be compared to the actual money 
measurement. Any substantial or systematic departure between those values 
would indicate a possible inconsistency between the scenarios and reality (or, 
maybe, a significant money demand structural change). It would anyway give 
the policymaker early alert regarding the economic conditions, since money 
measures tend to be available earlier to central bankers, and tend to be more 
reliable than inflation measures. 
  As an example, suppose that the policymaker has defined its interest 
rate target, which would be consistent with a certain projection for output 
and inflation. If she observes later that the actual monetary aggregate 
growth is above the projection coming from equation (2.1), she would know 
that maybe output is increasing faster than expected, or that perhaps price 8 
expectations are higher than previously thought. In a case like this, the 
money demand model would be able to give early warning to the policymaker, 
helping her to take preventive measures. 
  Note that the European Central Bank uses a similar kind of approach 
as one of the pillars of its stability strategy.3 It studies the demand trends for 
a broad aggregate (M3) and defines reference growth rates based on the 
policy goals. The Bank of England and the Central Bank of Chile, on the 
other hand, use the information from the aggregate growth rates as an 
economic indicator, but do not set aggregate growth targets as the ECB does.4 
3  Modeling the Brazilian Money Demand 
A money demand forecast model has to be found before the concept 
presented in the previous section can be applied to the Brazilian monetary 
history. For that, a sample of 240 monthly observations, covering January of 
1980 to December of 1999 is employed. Data are not seasonally adjusted. 
  As monetary variable, the Brazilian narrow money concept (M1), 
measured as monthly average daily balances, is employed. The general price 
index (P) from Fundação Getúlio Vargas, known as IGP-DI, is used to deflate 
                                            
3 European Central Bank (1999). 
4 The Bank of England (2000) states that “the money supply… could be a target of policy, but 
it need not be so. In the United Kingdom it is not, as we have an inflation target, and so 
monetary aggregates are indicators only.” The Central Bank of Chile (2000) states that 
“developments regarding monetary aggregates are relevant when evaluating the economy’s 
overall progress and the impact of monetary policy on it, even though the Central Bank has 
no explicit or implicit goals regarding these aggregates.” 9 
M1, leading to the real money stock variable (M). The interest rate (I) is the 
SELIC, the Central Bank nominal base interest rate, measured as the 
annualized monthly rate of return. The proxy for real output (CE) is the 
monthly national consumption of electricity. The logarithmic transformation 
is applied to all variables, with the exception of the interest rate, which is 
transformed into an instantaneous interest rate.5 
  Although energy consumption may not be a perfect proxy for output, it 
was chosen not only because it is available monthly but also because it is able 
to capture the growth of the underground economy in Brazil. Other activity 
variables have been considered, with less success. 
  Tests for the presence of unit roots in the series are performed. 
Appendix 1, Table 1, presents the results of the ADF unit root tests. The tests 
employ critical values from MacKinnon (1991) and two criteria to select the 
number of lags: Akaike information criterion and Schwert (1989) lag-
selection rule. The results indicate that the unit root hypothesis cannot be 
rejected in any case. The variables henceforth are assumed as being 
integrated of order one. 
  To confirm the results above, the null hypothesis of presence of unit 
root is tested against the alternative hypothesis of stationarity along a 
breaking or shifting trend. This test is well suited to the Brazilian case, 
where interventions have happened. The chosen approach is described in 
                                            
5 An instantaneous rate is given by the equation  ( ) i I + = 1 ln . 10 
Banerjee et al. (1992). The results are presented in Appendix 1, Table 2. The 
hypothesis of unit root cannot be rejected, and, in two cases, the hypothesis of 
integration of order two cannot be rejected too. It is assumed however that 
the order of integration is one for every variable. 
  Given that series are assumed to have a unit root, a cointegration test 
is in order. If the null hypothesis of noncointegration is rejected, then an 
error-correction mechanism model will be used. On the other hand, if there is 
no cointegration among the series, then the choice will be for a growth rate 
model (a model of first differences of logs). 
  Appendix 2 presents the results of the cointegration tests. The 
Johansen procedure is employed, with critical values given by Osterwald-
Lenum (1992) and corrected according to Cheung and Lai (1993).6 The null 
hypothesis of noncointegration is not rejected, therefore, a growth rate model 
is chosen. 
  The unrestricted model for M1 is therefore 
, ln ln ln





















− D  (3.1) 
where Λm is a vector of parameters, D is a vector of dummy variables, and µ 
represents the model innovations, which can be interpreted as being related 
to unobserved and independent changes in the velocity of circulation of 
                                            
6 See Johansen and Juselius (1990) and Johansen (1991). 11 
money. The sample regression was restricted to 204 observations, ranging 
from January of 1983 to December of 1999.7 
  The dummy vector D is composed of four different sets of 
interventions. One set is made by step and impulse dummies for stabilization 
plans in Brazil. An impulse dummy is defined as the first difference of a step 
dummy. Dummies are considered for the following plans: Cruzado (step and 
impulse on March 1986), Cruzado II (step and impulse on December 1986), 
Bresser (step and impulse on July 1987), Collor (step and impulse on March 
1990) and Real (step and impulse on July 1994, and impulse on August 1994). 
  The second set of dummies is used to treat the effect of the Brazilian 
bank account debits tax known as CPMF. The third set takes care of 
deterministic seasonal components. The fourth set deals with a variable 
seasonal component, which is a linear function of the nominal interest rate. 
  The dummies for the stabilization plans may be interpreted as controls 
for periods of chronic or temporary mismanagement of the money  supply. To 
avoid preselection of the mismanagement periods, the models for all 
stabilization plan subsamples are treated with dummies in the unrestricted 
model, and later the statistically insignificant dummies are excluded. Notice 
that dummies will not be used in the subsamples to be forecasted. Only 
preexisting information will be used for forecasting, as it would be done by 
policymakers under real operational conditions. 
                                            
7  Financial innovations related to changes in financial indexation between 1980 and 1982 
apparently generated unstable interest rate coefficients during this subperiod. 12 
  The variable seasonal dummies are essential to totally remove 
seasonal patterns from the innovations, which are a major source of monthly 
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being proxies for changes in the seasonal behavior of the agent when the 
opportunity cost of holding money changes. In Brazil, it is clear that the 
money demand seasonal pattern is accentuated by increases in the nominal 
interest rate. 
  A few explanations can be given to this phenomenon, among them the 
existence in Brazil of a 13th wage month, which coincides with the holiday 
season and represents a higher proportion of the real yearly income when 
nominal interest rates are high. Another explanation is related to the 
asymmetric use of cash during work and vacation periods. In Brazil, the 
latter usually coincides with the last and first months of the year, due to the 
academic calendar. Money demand during vacation months tends to be less 
sensitive to nominal interest rates than during other periods. Families hold 
more money due to traveling and holiday expenses, not caring as much about 
the opportunity costs as they would do during work periods. 
  The unrestricted model shown in (3.1) is estimated using OLS for the 
whole sample and for every subsample starting on 1983:01 and ending 
immediately before a stabilization plan. Variables and dummies with 
statistically insignificant coefficients are discarded (with the exception of the 13 
constant term, which is kept in order to avoid long-run forecast trend biases), 
leading to the restricted models presented in Table 4, Appendix 3. Table 5 
shows the values of the long-run coefficients for the interest rate (I) and for 
the output proxy (CE) 
  Notice from those statistics that the forecast models are able to 
satisfactorily explain money demand growth rates for every subsample. The 
estimated coefficients follow well-established money demand theoretical 
principles, showing a positive relation with the proxy for output and a 
negative relation with the nominal interest rate. Seasonal effects are 
significant both statistically and economically.8 
  The coefficients are reasonably stable among subsamples, with the 
exception of the subsample ending before the Cruzado plan. This subsample 
has a small number of observations, what could explain the departures in 
coefficient values. Yet, observe that the model for this subsample performs 
well, and is consistent in quality with the rest of the group. 
  The stability of the model and its forecast performance are statistically 
evaluated using an N-step ahead forecast test. The results are presented in 
Appendix 4, Figure 1. The test confirms that the model is acceptably stable, 
presenting good forecasting performance, particularly for subsamples ending 
after the Cruzado plan. 
                                            
8 The coefficients for inflation rate variables were not statistically significant. The nominal 
interest rate was always the best proxy for the opportunity cost of holding money. This could 
be a result of the widespread indexation of financial instruments in Brazil, and consequently 
of the population awareness of nominal interest rate levels. 14 
4  Evaluating the Stabilization Plans 
In this section, the money demand models are used to evaluate the 
stabilization plans. Figure 2 in Appendix 4  presents the monthly inflation 
rate and the nominal interest rate along the hyperinflationary period. The 
implementation dates of the stabilization plans are highlighted with dotted 
lines. 
Note from the graph that, even though the inflation rate never 
surpassed 100% per month, the process is clearly hyperinflationary. The 
inflation rate rises continuously, except during intervention periods.9 The 
Real plan was the only one that clearly succeeded at eliminating the 
hyperinflationary process. 
The procedure to be used is simple: the models for real M1 developed 
in the previous section are used to produce N-step-ahead forecasts, starting 
from the first month of implementation of each stabilization plan. These out-
of-sample forecasts take the actual values of the output proxy (CE) and of the 
nominal interest rate (I) as if they were the policymaker path choices. The 
expected nominal money growth rates are then obtained by combining the 
forecasted growth rates of real M1 with three different scenarios for the 
expected inflation rate trajectories, which represent hypothetical policymaker 
expected inflation rate path choices. 
                                            
9 This kind of inflationary process is alternatively defined in Garcia (1996) as a 
“megainflation,” in contrast with Cagan’s more stringent definition of hyperinflation, which 
did not account for interventions like those adopted in Brazil. 15 
Scenario 1, the most stringent, is based on a zero expected inflation 
rate path. This scenario may look artificial or unfeasible to the reader, given 
the zero inflation assumption. It is, however, the one that most adequately 
describes the expectations of the policymaker during all stabilization plans in 
Brazil, with the exception of the Real plan. This is because the latter was the 
only stabilization plan that was not based on generalized price controls. In all 
other plans, price increases were deemed illegal during a predetermined 
period following the intervention, such that zero inflation was essential for 
success.10 
Scenario 2 is based on the downward trajectory of inflation of the Real 
plan, which is taken as a proxy for the expected inflation rate. It is used as a 
forgiving yet feasible scenario for all plans. It is forgiving because the 
residual inflation rates of the first few months that followed the 
implementation of the Real plan are arguably too high for plans based on 
price controls.11 Unsuccessful plans have therefore the benefit of doubt under 
this scenario. 
Scenario 3 combines the Real plan inflation rate trajectory of the 
scenario 2 with the upper 95% (2 S.E.) interval of the forecasted money 
demand growth rate paths. Those forecast error intervals take in 
                                            
10 For example, one of the main operational elements of the Cruzado plan was a massive 
propaganda blitz exalting the new “zero inflation” economy, and requesting the help of all 
concerned citizens, which were turned into price control agents during a presidential address 
to the nation. As a result, significant episodes of revolt and vandalism took place once the 
government decided to give up price controls months later. 
11 The accumulated inflation rate of the first five months after the implementation of the 
Real plan was 37.5%.  16 
consideration residual and coefficient uncertainty. Under these conditions, 
there is only a 2.5% chance that actual money demand growth rates can be 
higher than the forecasted rates. This is an extremely forgiving scenario. 
Actual monetary growth rates above these trajectories, if remaining 
uncorrected, would almost surely doom a stabilization program. 
An adjustment was made when preparing scenarios 2 and 3. In the 
expected inflation rate trajectory, the inflation rate of the first month of the 
Real plan was replaced with the actual inflation rate of the first month of the 
stabilization plan under evaluation. This adjustment is necessary because the 
inflation of the first month after plan implementation is always contaminated 
with an idiosyncratic statistical carry-over effect resulting from the price 
index calculation procedure. This inflation residue needs to be taken in 
consideration when evaluating remonetization during the month following 
intervention.12 
After feeding the model with paths for every variable, remonetization 
trajectories were forecasted for the ten months that followed the adoption of 
each stabilization plan. The forecasted values were then compared with the 
actual M1 nominal growth rates. The results are presented in Appendix 5, 
Figures 3 to 8. Each plan will be discussed in detail in the following 
subsections. 
                                            
12 Some economists in Brazil have argued that this carry-over effect should be deducted from 
the inflation rate of the first month after plan implementation when calculating 
remonetization levels. According to this view, the adjustment used here would be forgiving of 
policymakers, erring on the loose side. 17 
4.1 Cruzado  Plan 
  Following Barbosa et al. (1989), the four main elements of the Cruzado 
plan were: (a) mandatory price controls; (b) deindexation of the economy; (c) 
monetary reform with the introduction of a new currency; and (d) conversion 
of wages, rents and other contractual incomes to the new currency, based on 
prestabilization average real values. The plan was implemented as a surprise 
measure on February 28, 1986, through Presidential Decrees that were later 
confirmed by the Congress.13 
  According to Simonsen (1989), the Cruzado plan did not succeed at 
stabilizing the Brazilian economy due to a plethora of theoretical and 
implementation errors. While prices were frozen, wages were increased by 
governmental decree. The popular price control legislation was extended 
beyond reasonable limits. The fixed exchange rate became rapidly 
overvalued. The government deficit did not fall, frustrating heterodox hopes. 
On the contrary, the government lost the inflation tax, and the 
remonetization did not significantly reduce government interest spending. 
Real interest rates were negative, since nominal rates were not high enough 
to cope with residual inflationary expectations. Finally, all monetary 
aggregates expanded substantially during the months that followed the plan 
implementation. For example, M4 expanded 20% from March to July. 
                                            
13 For additional discussion on the Cruzado plan, see, for example, Cardoso and Dornbusch 
(1987), Baer (1987), Pereira (1987), Welch et al. (1987), Cardoso (1992), and Agénor and 
Taylor (1993). 18 
  Due to price controls, shortages and black markets increasingly 
became the economic norm. The black market exchange rate spread, for 
example, rose from 26% to 48% during the three months following the plan. 
  Figure 3 shows that, according to scenarios 1 and 2, there was 
substantial monetary mismanagement during the ten months that followed 
the Cruzado plan, particularly during the first and second months. Notice 
that the remonetization of almost 50% that happened in the first month of 
the plan was excessive even according to the extremely forgiving scenario 3. 
Data indicate therefore that the Cruzado plan was victimized by monetary 
mismanagement. 
4.2 Bresser  Plan 
  According to Simonsen (1989), the Bresser plan was a reheated and 
short-lived version of the Cruzado plan, marked by unfulfilled promises of 
fiscal austerity. Figure 4 shows that the plan was followed by significant 
monetary mismanagement, even under the most forgiving scenario. The 
period reveals a total absence of monetary discipline. 
4.3 Verão  Plan 
  As it can be seen in Figure 5, the Verão plan, another version of the 
Cruzado plan redressed with renewed but unfulfilled promises of fiscal and 19 
monetary discipline, repeated almost the same pattern of mismanagement of 
the Bresser plan. 
4.4 Collor  Plan 
  Cardoso (1992), Tanner (1994), and Mèrette (2000) discuss the Collor 
plan. It combined some of the heterodox elements of the Cruzado plan, like 
price controls and another monetary reform, with an even more radical type 
of heterodoxy: the temporary confiscation of any kind of bank account balance 
above twelve hundred dollars – a form of debt moratorium. The confiscated 
resources were deposited in inflation-indexed accounts paying 6% yearly 
interest rates, which would be unblocked in twelve installments after an 
eighteen-month waiting period. 
  Due to the confiscation, available M4 was immediately reduced by 
68%. No need to say, such a traumatic and unpopular measure created 
enduring negative credibility effects for the Brazilian public and private 
financial institutions, and surely did not help the acting President when he 
was impeached by the Congress, less than three years after the plan’s 
adoption. 
  It should be noted on the other hand that the Collor plan represented 
the first serious attempt to implement important orthodox reforms, such as 
government spending cuts, tax increases, reduction of trade barriers, 20 
privatization, and deregulation. Those measures paved the way for the 
success of the Real plan, a little more than four years later. 
  The plan failed for many different reasons. It could never bring 
inflation below 9% per month. The public had become worn and cynical 
towards heavy-handed government interventions, after so many failed plans 
based on coercive measures. The confiscation did not hold for long: leakage of 
potentially destabilizing blocked funds into an unreputable financial and 
monetary system became a routine. Credibility of policies where at the 
lowest, limiting the power of fiscal and monetary authorities. 
  Figure 6 shows that the remonetization during the first three months 
of the Collor plan was compatible with scenario 2, even if excessive in the 
first month according to scenario 1 (zero inflation). The situation changes for 
worse however after the third month. Monetary mismanagement became the 
norm once more, as the confiscated funds were reinjected in the economy in 
an unplanned fashion, and M1 growth rates settled between 10% and 20% 
per month – excessive even when judged by the extremely forgiving 
standards of scenario 3. 
4.5  Collor II Plan 
  The Collor II plan was another failed attempt at recycling Cruzado 
plan tenets, leading once more to the same type of mismanagement pattern 
observed during the Bresser and Verão plans, as shown in Figure 7. 21 
4.6 Real  Plan 
  Sachs and Zini (1996), Dornbusch and Cline (1997), and Franco (2000) 
discuss the Real plan. Silva and Andrade (1996) argue that the plan 
borrowed the heterodox “indexed currency” idea from the so-called “Larida’s 
plan,” and corrected it with the arguably orthodox “Simonsen’s criticism.”14 
  The Real plan was in fact a very orthodox stabilization plan. It did not 
depend on surprise or coercive measures, like price controls. It was based on: 
(a) preaccumulation of international reserves; (b) incentives to foreign capital 
inflows; (c) fiscal budget tightening and privatizations; (d) realignment of 
prices before currency change, through the creation of an “indexed currency” 
called the URV;15 (e) monetary reform after price realignments, with the 
introduction of a new currency, the Real; (f) deindexation; and (g) 
establishment of a hidden exchange rate band and remonetization targets as 
nominal anchors.16 
  The Real plan succeeded at eliminating hyperinflation. Notice however 
that Brazil was only able to do it after twenty years of painful learning, and 
                                            
14 As stated by Silva and Andrade, “in fact the Real Plan is basically the Larida’s proposal 
corrected by Simonsen. Simonsen (1984) raised a fundamental point. He argued that the 
“equilibrium values” of prices and wages should be done before the introduction of the new 
currency otherwise the inflation would accelerate, and the new money unit would be born 
already corrupted. He suggested, therefore, that the first step to be taken should be the 
correction of the fundamentals; the second step, the conversion of incomes and contracts; and 
the third the introduction of the new currency. As we will see, these were exactly the steps 
followed by the stabilization program.” 
15 The URV was a unit of reference but not a means of transaction, a role similar to the ECU 
in Europe. 
16 The exchange rate band later became the main intermediate target, with the nominal 
interest rate acting as the main instrument target. 22 
that the plan’s success depended on the previous development of better 
analytical tools and skills by the government agencies.  
  Brazil has been cited once, regarding the successful implementation of 
its inflation targeting regime in 1999, as an example of how policymaking 
based on advanced theoretical and econometric tools can be put in place in a 
developing country, even in a short period of time.17 This statement can be 
misleading however if not considered from a wider perspective. The fast 
implementation of those measures could not have taken place without the 
development of government staff analytical skills that happened during the 
nineties. 
  Until the end of the eighties, the Central Bank of Brazil was, overall, 
an institution with low quantitative analytical capabilities. For example, its 
very first money demand model was developed in 1988, as described in Alvim 
(1988). The model had limited functionality however, and, as such, it was 
rarely used as a policymaking tool. 
                                            
17 According to Mishkin and Savastano (2001), the Brazilian new monetary regime adopted 
in 1999 had “all the ‘bells and whistles’ of an inflation targeting regime, and was clearly the 
first comprehensive attempt to establish a regime of this type in Latin America... Many 
central bankers in the Latin American region have been concerned that it might take them a 
long time to acquire the technical capability to issue an inflation report of this type. Brazil 
has shown the way, indicating that an inflation targeting regime, with a high degree of 
transparency and accountability can indeed be implemented quickly.” The inflation targeting 
experience, which is described in detail in Bogdanski et al. (2000), Mishkin and Savastano 
(2002), and Averbug (2002), has been mostly successful at maintaining low inflation rates, 
while protecting the country against external shocks, as discussed in Amann and Baer 
(2003). 23 
  Alvim’s model was the result of new staff development policies adopted 
by the Central Bank during the eighties.18 The policies were intensified in the 
beginning of the nineties, leading to remarkable increases in staff 
qualification. The implementation of the inflation targeting regime in 1999 
would possibly not have succeeded without the technical expertise 
accumulated by the staff during the nineties. 
  For this new generation of quantitatively oriented economists, the Real 
plan was the first ordeal and learning ground. Albuquerque (1994), for 
example, describes a functional money demand forecast model that helped to 
determine the remonetization growth rate targets used in the Real plan. 
  Even if not considered as the main foundation of the plan, the 
remonetization targets were carefully observed – a result of the active 
management of the monetary aggregates by the Central Bank during the 
remonetization period, as described in Franco (1995). 
  Figure 8 shows that M1 growth rates during the implementation of the 
Real plan were consistent with a scenario of lowering inflation. The excessive 
remonetization of the first month was apparently corrected with a low rate of 
monetary growth in the second month. Monetary growth rates after the third 
month were highly consistent with a trajectory of decreasing inflation, a 
                                            
18 Those policies included incentives for staff to engage in master and doctoral programs in 
economics, improved recruitment efforts, and better allocation of new employees. 24 
feature of the data that closely matches the description of the remonetization 
process presented in Franco (1995).19 
  It is not just coincidence, therefore, that the Real plan was the only 
stabilization plan that successfully disinflated the economy. The out-of-
sample predictions of the money demand models confirm that it was the sole 
intervention episode presenting correctly managed monetary growth rates. 
Conclusions 
The paper gives an example of how a money demand model can be 
used to evaluate a country’s monetary policy. The idea is to check the 
consistency between the money supply growth rates and the expected money 
demand growth rates conditional on the policymaker choices for interest rate, 
output, and inflation rate paths. 
The concept was applied to the Brazilian case by modeling real M1. 
Based on unit root and cointegration tests, a growth rate model was chosen, 
taking in consideration the many interventions that happened during the 
sample period (1983-1999). The forecast model is shown to be acceptably 
stable. 
As an original feature of the model presented in this paper, a variable 
seasonal pattern, which was defined as a linear function of the nominal 
                                            
19 It is stated in that paper that the effects of the restrictive monetary measures on prices 
were impressive, particularly after the new restrictive measures adopted in October. 25 
interest rate, increased the model ability to explain seasonal changes in the 
money demand. Despite the economic instability that marked the Brazilian 
economic history during the last two and a half decades, the model showed 
good fit and predictive performance. 
  Finally, using the model as a forecasting tool, it was shown that 
unsuccessful macroeconomic stabilization programs in Brazil were marked by 
excessive monetary growth rates during low inflation intervention periods. 
The results not only suggest that the mismanagement of the monetary 
aggregates were among the main causes of the failure of the stabilization 
plans, but also that the excessive liquidity could have been predicted during 
the implementation periods. 
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Appendix 1 
Table 1 – Unit Root Test 
(a) 
Series Schwert  Criterion 
(b)  Akaike Criterion (AIC) 
(c) 
  t  φ  p  t  φ  p 
Level 
ln M  -1.67 0.974  14 -1.67 0.974  14 
I  -1.93 0.930  14 -3.36 0.907 1 
ln CE  -1.50 0.954  14 -2.89 0.906  25 
First Difference 
ln M  -4.30** 0.150 14 -4.38** 0.175 13 
I  -4.91** -0.88 14 -14.8** 0.033  1 
ln CE  -4.40** -1.50 14 -3.77*  -1.30 17 
*    null hypothesis of presence of unit root rejected at 5%; 
**  null hypothesis of presence of unit root rejected at 1%; 
(a)  augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF): 
t
p




1 1 , critical values from MacKinnon (1991); 
(b)  () [ ]
4 1 100 / 12 int T p = ; 
(c)  maximum number of lags bound to 10% of the sample size. 
 
 
Table 2 – Sequential Unit Root Test 
(a) 
Series Trend  Shift 
(b) Mean  Shift 
(c) 
  ( ) δ ~ ~
DF t  
* ~min
DF t   p  ( ) δ ~ ~
DF t  
* ~min
DF t   p 
Level 
ln M  -2.00 -2.67  14 -1.66 -2.26  14 
I  -3.30 -3.30  14 -0.50 -2.78  14 
ln CE  1.413 -2.61 14 -1.59 -1.70 14 
First Difference 
ln M  -4.74** -4.75** 14  -4.32  -4.45  14 
I  -5.40**  -5.40**  14  -3.24    -5.70**  14 
ln CE  -5.17** -5.17** 14  -4.33  -4.45  14 
*    null hypothesis of presence of unit root rejected at 5%; 
**  null hypothesis of presence of unit root rejected at 2.5%; 
(a)  According to Banerjee et al. (1992): 
() t
p




1 1 2 1 , 
() [ ]
4 1 100 / 12 int T p = ; 
(b)  () ( ) ( ) k t k t k > ⋅ − = τ 1 , where  () ⋅ 1  is the indicator function; 
(c)  () ( ) k t k > = τ 1 . 31 
Appendix 2 
Table 3 – Cointegration Test 
(a) 
Series Schwert  Criterion 
(b) 
 1
st LR  2
nd LR  3
rd LR  p 
ln M, I, ln CE  40.56 12.77  4.57  14 
*    significant at 5% - critical values corrected following Cheung and Lai (1993); 
**  significant at 1% - critical values corrected following Cheung and Lai (1993); 
(a)  Johansen likelihood ratio (LR) cointegration rank test, trace statistic, intercept and trend 
in cointegration equation, intercept and trend in VAR; 
  a significant 1
st LR statistic indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of cointegration rank 
equal to zero (rejection of noncointegration); 
  a significant 2
nd LR statistic indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of cointegration rank 
lower than or equal to one (rejection of noncointegration and of cointegration with one 
cointegrating vector); 
  a significant 3
rd LR statistic indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of cointegration rank 
lower than or equal to two (rejection of noncointegration, cointegration with one 
cointegrating vector, and cointegration with two cointegrating vectors); 
critical values come from Osterwald-Lenum (1992) and Cheung and Lai (1993); 
  p represents the number of lags as in Johansen and Juselius (1990); 
 (b)  () [ ]
4 1 100 / 12 int T p = ; 32 
Appendix 3 
Table 4 – Estimated Coefficients
 
Dependent Variable: ∆(ln Mt) – Method: Least Squares 
Sample  83:01 – 99:12 83:01 – 86.02 83:01 – 87:06 83:01 – 89:01 83:01 – 90:02 83:01 – 91:02 83:01 – 94:06
Before plan    Cruzado Bresser  Verão  Collor  Collor  II  Real 
Included observations  204  38 54 73 86 98  138 
Variable  Coeff.  t-Stat.  Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat Coeff. t-Stat
Constant  -0.010  -1.40 -0.007 -1.28 -0.013 -1.89 -0.008 -1.16 -0.012 -1.54 -0.012  -1.51 -0.011 -1.45
∆(ln Mt-2)  0.159  5.40  0.590 5.30 0.299 4.49 0.197 3.32 0.123 2.23  0.084 2.04 0.116 3.05
∆(It)  -0.069  -9.81 -0.122 -3.51 -0.125 -7.11 -0.087 -6.40 -0.075 -6.99 -0.079 -12.41 -0.064 -8.02
∆(It-1)  -0.086 -15.64 -0.057 -1.78 -0.093 -5.38 -0.105 -8.41 -0.093 -8.48 -0.079 -12.98 -0.086 -13.75
∆(ln CEt-1)  0.453  4.35  0.424 2.63 0.305 2.05 0.451 3.38 0.372 2.62  0.327 2.38 0.336 2.71
Cruzadot  0.059  3.65   0.038 2.19 0.046 2.63 0.063 3.39 0.072  3.92 0.065 3.53
∆(Cruzado)t  0.311  7.03   0.254 5.53 0.297 6.64 0.292 5.92 0.270  5.57 0.307 6.18
Cruzado2t  -0.147  -6.63   -0.107 -3.85 -0.121 -4.45 -0.155 -5.68 -0.171  -6.72 -0.162 -6.38
Bressert  0.095  6.01   0.071 3.96 0.100 5.48  0.103 5.54 0.098 5.45
∆(Collort)  0.128  2.32       0.143 2.28
∆(Real t)  0.227  4.53      
∆(Real t-1)  -0.180  -3.89      
∆(CPMF t-1)  0.240  5.75      
Seasonal(February)  -0.102  -6.82   -0.071 -3.94 -0.077 -3.26  -0.080  -3.44 -0.091 -4.08
Seasonal(April)      0.051 2.73 0.046 2.31    
Seasonal(May)  -0.027  -2.52      
Seasonal(August)  -0.032  -3.08 -0.044 -2.39 -0.042 -2.27 -0.038 -2.37 -0.047 -2.79 -0.047  -2.86 -0.041 -2.86
Seasonal(December)  0.144  10.79   0.059 1.83 0.083 3.88 0.133 5.78 0.137  5.85 0.138 6.20
∆(IJanuary,t)  -0.024  -5.05  0.087 7.17 0.044 3.52 -0.017 -2.44 -0.020  -2.79 -0.023 -3.51
∆(IDecember,t)  0.025  5.41  0.137 11.84 0.093 4.49 0.051 6.11 0.024 3.57  0.025 3.58 0.027 4.04
R-squared  0.910  0.872 0.940 0.913 0.894 0.908 0.889 
Adjusted R-squared  0.899  0.837 0.922 0.895 0.875 0.893 0.877 
S.E. of regression  0.037  0.027 0.033 0.036 0.042 0.044 0.044 
Sum squared resid  0.249  0.022 0.044 0.077 0.124 0.161 0.241 
Log likelihood  395.0  87.82 115.4 146.5 159.2 175.1 242.3 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.189  2.289 1.934 1.915 1.339 1.504 1.990 
Mean dependent var  -0.0004  -0.016 -0.011 -0.014 -0.018 -0.008 -0.013 
S.D. dependent var  0.117  0.068 0.117 0.111 0.117 0.134 0.126 
Akaike info criterion  -3.647  -4.149 -3.792 -3.659 -3.377 -3.288 -3.294 
Schwarz criterion  -3.273  -3.761 -3.313 -3.251 -2.977 -2.918 -2.976 
F-statistic  83.32  24.74 53.17 52.17 46.59 63.55 70.48 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
Table 5 – Estimated Long-Run Coefficients
 
Variable  Sample (before plan) 
  83:01 – 99:12  83:01 – 86.02  83:01 – 87:06  83:01 – 89:01  83:01 – 90:02  83:01 – 91:02  83:01 – 94:06 
    (Cruzado) (Bresser)  (Verão)  (Collor) (Collor  II)  (Real) 
I  -0.184  -0.437 -0.311 -0.239 -0.192 -0.172 -0.170 




Figure 1 – N-Step Ahead Forecast Test 
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1986:01 1986:04 1986:07 1986:10
Actual M1 growth
Forecast, zero inflation (scenario 1)
Forecast, Real plan inflation (scenario2)
Forecast + 2 S.E. (scenario 3)
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Actual M1 growth
Forecast, zero inflation (scenario 1)
Forecast, Real plan infl. (scenario 2)
Forecast + 2 S.E. (scenario 3)
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Actual M1 growth
Forecast, zero inflation (scenario 1)
Forecast, Real plan inflation (scenario 2)
Forecast + 2 S.E. (scenario 3)
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Actual M1 growth
Forecast, zero inflation (scenario 1)
Forecast, Real plan infl. (scenario 2)
Forecast + 2 S.E. (scenario 3)
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Actual M1 growth
Forecast, zero inflation (scenario 1)
Forecast, Real plan inflation (scenario 2)
Forecast + 2 S.E. (scenario 3)
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Actual M1 growth
Forecast, zero inflation (scenario 1)
Forecast, Real plan inflation (scenario 2)
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